Russia's possible futures

Much has been said about the political and parapolitical system that Vladimir Putin has forcibly sculpted, but in this article I propose to put on the high beams and imagine two possible transformations of Russia. Imagining a Russia without Putin becomes complicated for all the people born after the Fall of the Berlin Wall; since for the age in which they began to be aware of the world, Putin was already in the Kremlin and so on until today. However, the Russian leader, who is on his way to surpass Stalin himself in longevity, is not eternal; and taking into account that life expectancy for Russian men does not exceed 67 years on average and he is 71, that future may be closer than it seems.

Putin sees himself as a Tsar but in a 21st century style, with periodic elections and a constitution that replaces the mystical-religious elements of absolute monarchies with a more modern legitimization. On the other hand, the system draws on sources similar to Tsarism, these being the Orthodox Church, the Army and a Court of the nouveau riche whose position (and life) depends on their closeness to the new Tsar and their total loyalty. However, the question of his succession has not been resolved (at least not in public knowledge). Putin's neo-Tsarism is not hereditary, nor does it have a Party that elects a new general secretary, the option of transfer of power through free elections is not on the table. The emperor's suit is so tailored to Putin that it seems unlikely that another man (or woman) would fit into it.

So let's look at two possible futures for the Eurasian power based on its history, the paths other countries have taken, and the drift Russia has taken after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Russia capital city Paris

The first possible future is for Russia to become a new France. Taking into account the historical similarities of: Triumphant revolutions, colonial empires, world references of role models, absolutist and totalitarian experiences, exacerbated nationalism, disputes with the main Church, territorial conflicts with neighbors, are great military land powers, the myth of the great executive “man” (Catherine the Great, Napoleon, Stalin, De Gaulle, Putin, etc.). It is not difficult to imagine a medium, long term future where Russia turns to the West and can embrace liberal democracy. France went through many phases before consolidating itself as the democracy it is today. Two Bonaparte-imprinted Empires, four failed republican experiments, the Dreyfus affair, the partition of its territory (Republic of Vichy), colonial wars such as Algeria , etc.

Putin's successor may see in Charles De Gaulle a reference to follow. De Gaulle came to power to reform France and avoid a civil war. To do so, he confronted the formal power of the parliament and drafted a constitution that, despite having the trappings of a Charter, managed to outlive its creator and constitute the most stable political regime France has ever known in its history. Whoever comes after Putin may choose the path of perestroika, of reform, which will place Russia on the continent that studies Pericles before Confucius.

Russia capital city Pyongyang

This other possibility represents a future where the bunker beats perestroika. Attending to the drift Russia has taken after the invasion of Ukraine this future seems closer than the first one and may be realized with Putin still in power. The voluntary full-scale invasion of Ukraine that began in February 2022 and is still continuing has broken most of Russia's bridges with the West and with much of the International Community. The return to the imperialism of military conquest breaks with the consensuses established after World War II and leaves Russia more isolated internationally and closed in on itself. In this scenario, Russia is the country with the most sanctions imposed on it in the world, the core of power is increasingly closed and shrinking. The use of force to repress the civilian population is intensifying and the assassination of opposition leaders marks the beginning of election campaigns.

If Russia takes the North Korean path, it will take the path of autarchy, of a hyper-militarized society, of elites strongly influenced by a paranoid perception of relations with itself, with society and with other countries. The cult of personality of the leader with messianic overtones weakens or directly eliminates possible counterweights to the power of the president. There is currently no division of powers in Russia. The Russian Parliament, the Duma, no longer acts as a check on the executive but as a ratifier of its actions; the parties of the institutionalized “opposition” have as much room for maneuver as a car without a steering wheel. The same can be said of the judiciary whose membership in the Supreme Court is determined by the President.

Under Putin the military and intelligence powers have achieved a privileged status in the Russian power organigram, just as in North Korea. This military caste known as silovikis is the major beneficiary of this authoritarian (or semi-totalitarian) drift that is posed in this scenario. The situation of constant existential danger, expansionist imperialist wars and reinforced internal repression makes them vital for the maintenance of the North Korean regime.

In short, there are two possible political regime changes in Russia. The democratic or the authoritarian. Russia's history shows that it has been a timid country when it comes to taking the democratic and/or liberal path. Like France, its political culture has accustomed the country to the image of a strong leadership embodied in the head of state and this is difficult to change. However, this does not rule out that the path of protection of civil rights and liberties, the division of powers and the predominance of dialogue over imposition are out of the equation. For this to happen, the incentives to take the democratic path must outweigh those offered by the authoritarian path and for this reason the current Russian elites are more comfortable with the Pyongyang path, but not the civil society.